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HUMAN RIGHTS AND CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Scott J. Shackelford JD, PhD*
ABSTRACT
No company, just like no nation, is an island in cyberspace; the actions of
actors from hacktivists to nation-states have the potential to impact the bottom line,
along with the human rights of consumers and the public writ large. To help meet
the multifaceted challenges replete in a rapidly globalizing world—and owing to
the relative lack of binding international law to regulate both cybersecurity and the
impact of business on human rights—companies are reconceptualizing what con-
stitutes “due diligence.” This Article takes lessons from both the cybersecurity and
human rights due diligence contexts to determine areas for cross-pollination in an
effort to provide firms with a more comprehensive view of due diligence best prac-
tices divorced from a particular technological or cultural context. In so doing, this
Article uses the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as a starting
point, marrying this framework with the relevant cybersecurity literature and the
overarching analytical framework of polycentric governance. Ultimately, this Article
argues that organizations should take a wider view of enterprise risk management
that combines their cybersecurity and human rights aspirations given the growing
extent to which these fields are becoming interlinked under the umbrella of sustain-
able development.
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“Companies have a responsibility to respect human rights, which
means to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of
others.”1
INTRODUCTION
No company, just like no nation, is an island in cyberspace; the
actions of actors from hacktivists to nation states have the potential
to impact the bottom line, along with the human rights of consum-
ers and the public writ large. A case in point is the alleged Russian
penetration of the Democratic National Committee’s servers during
the 2016 campaign, raising the specter of cyber insecurity, civil
rights violations, and rising geopolitical tensions in a single epi-
sode.2 To help meet the multifaceted challenges replete in a rapidly
globalizing world—and owing to the relative lack of binding inter-
national law regulating both cybersecurity and the intersection of
business on human rights—companies and countries are reconcep-
tualizing what constitutes “due diligence.”3 This Article takes
lessons from both the cybersecurity and human rights due diligence
contexts to determine areas for cross-pollination in an effort to pro-
vide firms with a more comprehensive view of due diligence best
practices divorced from a particular technological or cultural con-
text.4 In so doing, this Article uses the Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights5 as a starting point, marrying this
1. INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., THE “STATE OF PLAY” OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILI-
GENCE: ANTICIPATING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, 1 (2011), http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/The_
State_of_Play_of_Human_Rights_Due_Diligence.pdf.
2. See Ellen Nakashima, Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposition Re-
search on Trump, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-
trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4-316e-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html.
3. See Jamie D. Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, Business, Human Rights, and the Promise
of Polycentricity, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 452 (2014).
4. See, e.g., Human Rights Due Diligence, BUS. & HUMAN RTS. RES. CTR., http://business-
humanrights.org/en/un-guiding-principles/implementation-tools-examples/implementa
tion-by-companies/type-of-step-taken/human-rights-due-diligence (last visited Apr. 16, 2017)
(“According to the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework, human rights due dili-
gence is: ‘An ongoing risk management process . . . in order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account
for how [a company] addresses its adverse human rights impacts. It includes four key steps: assessing
actual and potential human rights impacts; integrating and acting on the findings; tracking responses;
and communicating about how impacts are addressed.’”). This approach was chosen given the
tendency of organizations to consider due diligence from an, at times, myopic lens that can
be far too narrow given the multifaceted risks facing firms. See, e.g., Peter Howson, Identifying
and Minimizing the Strategic Risks from M&A, in APPROACHES TO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
153, 154 (2010).
5. See, e.g., JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 78 (2013) (“The overriding lesson I drew . . . was that a new regulatory dynamic was
SUMMER 2017] Human Rights and Cybersecurity 861
framework with the relevant cybersecurity literature6 and the over-
arching analytical framework of polycentric governance. Ultimately,
this Article argues that organizations should take a wider view of
enterprise risk management that combines their cybersecurity and
human rights aspirations given the growing extent to which these
fields are becoming interlinked under the umbrella of sustainable
development.7
This Article is structured as follows. Part I begins the analysis by
defining key terms including cyber peace, sustainable development,
and polycentric governance. Part II centers on the concept of
human rights due diligence focusing on the Ruggie Framework.
Part III builds from the discussion of human rights and discusses
the emerging field of cybersecurity due diligence, with special at-
tention being paid to how the concept is being operationalized in
the public and private sectors. Finally, Part IV concludes the com-
parative analysis and discusses the extent to which human rights
and cybersecurity are cross pollinating, emphasizing what that
required under which public and private governance systems . . . each come to add distinct
value, compensate for one another’s weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles—out of
which a more comprehensive and effective global regime might evolve, including specific
legal measures. International relations scholars call this ‘polycentric governance.’”).
6. See Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International
Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Public and Private Sectors, 17 CHI. J. OF INT’L L.
1 (2016); Scott J. Shackelford & Scott Russell, Operationalizing Cybersecurity Due Diligence: A
Transatlantic Case Study, 67 S.C. L. REV. 609 (2016).
7. See, e.g., INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, Action Line C5 (Building Confidence and Security in the
Use of ICTs)—National Cybersecurity Strategies for Sustainable Development, WSIS FORUM, https://
www.itu.int/net4/wsis/forum/2016/Agenda/Session/120 (last visited Apr. 16, 2017). Al-
though the topic of human rights due diligence has received attention in the literature, the
intersection with cybersecurity and Internet governance has been underappreciated. See, e.g.,
Larry Cata Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable Governance: The Guid-
ing Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the
Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69,
85 (2012) (“This focus suggested both the governance character of the device - human rights
due diligence was the expression of the “law” of corporate behavior within its operational
framework - and the means through which it could enforce its norms and connect them to
the governance systems of states and international actors.”). Cf. Oren Gross, Cyber Responsibil-
ity to Protect: Legal Obligations of States Directly Affected by Cyber-Incidents, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
481, 494 (2015) (discussing conceptions of cybersecurity due diligence but neglecting its
intersection with human rights). “Sustainable development” is discussed in detail in Part
I(B). See Topic: Sustainable Development, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://
www.iisd.org/topic/sustainable-development (last visited Apr. 16, 2017) (“Sustainable devel-
opment is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the
concept of needs, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding
priority should be given; and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and
social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.”).
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portends for the future of both due diligence and sustainable devel-
opment and how firms should use this combined, more holistic,
framework for business decision-making.
I. DEFINING KEY TERMS
In order to proceed with the analysis, it is important first to de-
fine key terms to provide framework for discussion. This Part
proceeds by first introducing the multifaceted cyber threat and the
concept of cyber peace before moving on to discuss the concepts of
due diligence, sustainable development, and polycentrism. Parts II
and III will then build from this discussion by investigating the in-
tersections between human rights and cybersecurity due diligence.
A. The Multifaceted Cyber Threat Facing the Private Sector
and “Cyber Peace”
From vulnerabilities in the SWIFT system undergirding interna-
tional finance, to attacks on critical infrastructure operated
primarily by private firms, to smart phones that can be turned into
microphones,8 organizations of all sizes are increasingly in the
cross-hairs of cyber attackers that can range from hacktivists to na-
tion-states. Data on the number and type of cyber attacks impacting
the private sector in particular is notoriously difficult to pin down.
Companies rarely compile, organize, and transmit data on cyber at-
tacks due in part to liability concerns.9 This concern was addressed
somewhat by the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which among other
things, laid out liability protections for firms that voluntarily share
their cyber threat data with the federal government.10 However, this
congressional fix was far from the “comprehensive” bill originally
envisioned, which is why President Obama had continued with ex-
ecutive action that, among other things, expanded public-private
8. See Trevor Hughes, Anti-Virus Pioneer John McAfee: Your Phone may be Snooping on You,
USA TODAY (May 14, 2016, 5:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/05/11/
anti-virus-pioneer-john-mcafee-warns-mobile-phone-snooping/84266838/ (noting that, ac-
cording to John McAfee, “the danger comes from the camera and microphones we carry
everywhere in our pockets, attached to our smartphones. It’s a ‘trivial’ matter, he says, for a
hacker to remotely and secretly turn on a phone’s sensors.”).
9. See SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSI-
NESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 202 (2014) [hereinafter MANAGING CYBER
ATTACKS].
10. See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) (fo-
cusing on incentivizing information sharing to improve national cybersecurity).
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information sharing and established the National Institute for Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework comprised
partly of private-sector best practices that companies could adopt to
better secure critical infrastructure.11 Although the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) published disclosure require-
ments back in 2011, it interpreted existing regulations broadly,
requiring disclosure of “material” attacks leading to financial
losses,12 and suggested that more robust reporting requirements
are in the pipeline.13 Moreover, there is evidence that even for
those firms that should be reporting such breaches to the SEC, they
have not been doing so either because they were not aware of the
breach (which is reportedly still the case in the majority of inci-
dents) or because of a lack of enforcement mechanisms.14
Given the complexities inherent in mitigating cyber risk, more
firms are moving from a reactive, defensive posture, to a proactive
approach to cybersecurity risk management that includes a range of
technological, organizational, and budgetary best practices.15 In-
creasingly, these concepts are being bundled together within the
growing literature on due diligence. While most of the attention on
this concept initially came from the private sector, led by industries
such as insurance, governments are also increasingly developing
the concept, including the U.S. and Germany as is discussed further
in Part III. Before turning to a full discussion of this concept,
11. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK § 1.0, at 1
(2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf.
12. DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2 Cybersecurity, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-
topic2.htm; Joel Bronstein, The Balance Between Informing Investors and Protecting Companies: A
Look at the Division of Corporation Finance’s Recent Guidelines on Cybersecurity Disclosure Require-
ments, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 257, 271 (2012) (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), which defined “material” as “a substantial likelihood that the disclo-
sure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”).
13. See, e.g., SEC Staff Provides Guidance on Disclosure Obligations Relating to Cybersecurity
Risks and Cyber Incidents, WSGR ALERT (Oct. 18, 2011), https://www.wsgr.com/publications/
PDFSearch/wsgralert-cybersecurity-risks.pdf [hereinafter WSGR ALERT]; Chris Strohm, SEC
Chairman Reviewing Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, BLOOMBERG (May 13, 2013, 3:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-13/sec-chairman-reviewing-company-cybersecuri
ty-disclosures.html (reporting that the SEC is exploring strengthening cyber attack disclosure
requirements).
14. See Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Hacked Companies Still Not Telling Investors, REUTERS (Feb.
2, 2012, 5:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hacking-disclosures-idUSTRE8110YW
20120202.
15. For more on this topic, see MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS, supra note 9, at 210–30;
Amanda Craig et al., Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 18
AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 722 (2015).
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though, it is important to understand the concepts of cyber peace,
sustainable development, and polycentric governance.
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a UN spe-
cialized agency focusing on information and communication
technologies (ICT), pioneered some of the early work in the field
of cyber peace studies along with the Vatican and the World Feder-
ation of Scientists by defining the term in part as “a universal order
of cyberspace” built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the ab-
sence of disorder or disturbance and violence . . . .”16 Although
certainly desirable, such an outcome, e.g., the end of cyber attacks,
is politically and technically unlikely, at least in the near term.17
That is why cyber peace is defined here not as the absence of con-
flict, a state of affairs that may be more accurately called negative
cyber peace.18 Rather, it is the construction of a network of mul-
tilevel regimes that promote global, just, and sustainable
cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies and
countries alike in order to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict,
crime, and espionage to levels comparable to other business and
national security risks.19 To achieve this goal, a new approach to
cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the public
and private sectors to enhance cybersecurity due diligence. Work-
ing together through polycentric partnerships (defined in Part
I(C)), we can mitigate the risk of cyber conflict by laying the
groundwork for a positive cyber peace that respects human rights,
spreads Internet access along with best practices, and strengthens
governance mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder collabora-
tion.20 Already some of the public- and private-sector efforts may be
bearing fruit with, by some estimates, the severity of cyber attacks
16. Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in HAMADOUN I. TOURE´, THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE
77, 78 (2011), http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-
E.pdf. (arguing that “unprovoked offensive cyber action, indeed any cyber attack, is incom-
patible with the tenets of cyber peace.”).
17. To its credit, though, the ITU report recognizes this fact, and that the concept of
cyber peace should be broad and malleable given an ever-changing political climate and
cyber threat landscape. Id. at 78 (“The definition [of cyber peace] cannot be watertight, but
must be rather intuitive, and incremental in its list of ingredients.”).
18. The notion of negative peace has been applied in diverse contexts, including civil
rights. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Nonviolence and Racial Justice, 74 CHRISTIAN CENTURY
165, 165 (1957) (arguing “[t]rue peace is not merely the absence of some negative force –
tension, confusion or war; it is the presence of some positive force – justice, good will and
brotherhood.”).
19. For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see the original publication of this
conceptualization in the Foreword to MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS, supra note 9.
20. See Johan Galtung, Peace, Positive and Negative, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEACE PSY-
CHOLOGY 1, 1 (Daniel J. Christie ed., 2011) (comparing the concepts of negative and positive
peace).
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beginning to plateau and “an emerging norm against the use of
severe state-based cyber-tactics” evolving.21 Further progress may be
made by applying lessons learned from the sustainable develop-
ment and polycentric governance contexts.
B. Global Approaches to “Sustainable Development”
Sustainable development has been defined by the UN Brund-
tland Report as “development that meets the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs.”22 The term has found expression in all manner of
legal instruments and civil society position papers at the national
and international levels,23 ranging from the 1946 International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling to the 1983 Interna-
tional Tropical Timber Agreement.24 The concept has even found
some traction in space law and policy circles. For example, interna-
tional law requires States, “to avoid activities that would be harmful
to the environment of the earth or to celestial bodies. . . .”25 This
‘no harm’ provision is a key part of fostering both due diligence—
as will be discussed in Parts II and III—as well as sustainable devel-
opment in space, but it is also left largely undefined, like so much
of space law. Limited progress was made by the UN General Assem-
bly in 2010, which added the objective of sustainable development
alongside international cooperation to foster the peaceful use of
space.26
21. Brandon Valeriano & Ryan C. Maness, The Coming Cyberpeace: The Normative Argument
Against Cyberwarfare, FOREIGN AFF. (May 13, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
2015-05-13/coming-cyberpeace.
22. WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE, U.N. Doc. A/42/427, at 37
(1987) (1987), http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf; see also Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78 (Sept. 25) (defining sustainable devel-
opment as “[the] need to reconcile economic development with protection of the
environment[.]”).
23. See, e.g., JOHN PEZZEY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
55-62 (1992), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/237241468766168949/pdf/
multi-page.pdf.
24. Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 213, 222 (1991).
25. James Kraska, Indistinct Legal Regimes, in SECURING FREEDOM IN THE GLOBAL COMMONS
49, 60 (Scott Jasper ed., 2010).
26. See G.A. Res. 64/86, International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(Jan. 13, 2010); Nima Nayebi, The Geosynchronous Orbit and the Outer Limits of Westphalian Sover-
eignty, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 471, 477 n.33 (2011).
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Since at least the 1980s, the international community has tried to
create a single, comprehensive, and consensual framework for sus-
tainable development.27 Yet results so far have been mixed, both in
terms of conceptual clarity and programmatic success. Some pro-
gress was made, though, in reviewing the five main  principles
coming out of the International Law Association’s (ILA) New Delhi
Declaration on Principles of International Law Relating to Sustaina-
ble Development, which included: integrated policy assessment,
environmental sustainability, intergenerational equity, robust politi-
cal participation, and intergenerational responsibility.28 The ITU
has also been integral in pushing the boundaries of the concept,
especially as it is applied to ICT. For example, former ITU Secretary
General Dr. Hamadoun I. Toure´ has stated of the connection be-
tween sustainability and cybersecurity that: “[o]ur common vision
of the information society envisages safe, secure, and affordable ac-
cess to global networks. It is a key component in ensuring social
and economic progress and sustainable development for people in
every corner of the world.”29 Aside from highlighting the positive
vision of a sustainable cyber peace,30 this quote also underscores the
importance of cybersecurity itself in furthering the sustainability
movement. Indeed, concepts from sustainability—from integrated
reporting to certificate programs to leveraging the power of supply
chains to spread positive network effects—have increasingly been
applied to mitigating cyber risk.31 This connection is further mani-
fest in a myriad of ways, from making energy-intensive data centers
more environmentally friendly32 to bridging the often artificial di-
vides between cybersecurity, and human rights such as privacy, and
Internet governance. If this conceptualization is indeed accurate,
then managing cyber attacks more effectively by instilling cyber-
security best practices while expanding Internet access and
promoting human rights is vital to attaining the core tenants of sus-
tainable development. At the firm level, this process is
27. See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 2109, 2115 (2005).
28. See The 70th Conference of the International Law Association (ILA), ILA New Delhi
Declaration on Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/
CONF.199/8 (Apr. 2, 2002), http://cisdl.org/tribunals/pdf/NewDelhiDeclaration.pdf.
29. MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS, supra note 9, at xiii.
30. For more on the distinction between negative and positive peace, see id. at xxv.
31. See Scott J. Shackelford & Timothy L. Fort, Sustainable Cybersecurity: Applying Lessons
from the Green Movement to Managing Cyber Attacks, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1995 (laying out the
argument for applying concepts from the field of sustainable development to addressing an
array of cybersecurity issues).
32. See, e.g., Jen A. Miller, How the Tech Industry is Greening its Data Centers, CIO (Aug. 19,
2015, 6:27 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2972935/data-center/how-the-tech-industry-is-
greening-its-data-centers.html.
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operationalized through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to
build, or if necessary rebuild, trust.33 But in order for the full prom-
ise of both cyber peace and sustainable development to be realized,
CSR should be married with the historically more top-down frame-
work of international human rights law to help build a polycentric
approach to promoting sustainable cybersecurity as is discussed fur-
ther in Part IV.34
C. Introducing Polycentrism
Given the relative lack of binding black letter law in both the
human rights and cybersecurity contexts, coupled with the active
role played by governments and firms in each setting, it is impor-
tant to move beyond stale approaches to regulation and recognize
the dynamism possible by leveraging the power of polycentric gov-
ernance. Sometimes called the Bloomington School of Political
Economy, the “basic idea” of polycentric governance, according to
Professor Michael McGinnis, is that a group facing a collective ac-
tion problem “should be able to address” it in “whatever way they
[the members of the group] best see fit.”35 This could include using
existing governance structures or crafting new systems.36 Polycen-
tric governance regimes that are multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-
type, and multi-sectoral in scope37 could complement the top-down
governance model favored throughout much of the history of
human rights governance. Indeed, this polycentric model has al-
ready prevailed in the Internet governance context, which has
enjoyed a more organic development trajectory.38 Yet this trend is a
33. See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Timothy L. Fort & Jamie D. Prenkert, How Businesses
Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 353 (2015).
34. ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE ENVI-
RONMENT 47 (2007). For more on the role that polycentric governance can play in enhancing
cybersecurity, see Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyber Peace: Managing Cyber Attacks through
Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273 (2013).
35. Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An Equilibrium
Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1 (The Vincent & Elinor Ostrom Workshop in
Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Working Paper W11-3, 2011), http://php.indiana.edu/
~mcginnis/Beijing_core.pdf.
36. Id. at 1–2.
37. See Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom Work-
shop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 169, 171 (2011) (defining
“polycentricity” as “a system of governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdic-
tions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions under which these
authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as
well as the constraints put upon their activities for public purposes.”).
38. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, GE-
ORGETOWN J. INT’L AFF. 81, 82 (2015).
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double-edged sword with many nations seeking to assert greater
control online, challenging the notion of cyberspace as a commons
and fracturing governance at a time of increasing cyber insecurity.39
Indeed, polycentric governance is quickly coming into vogue as
the preferred model of tackling “new” global collective action
problems, marking a shift from more traditional twentieth century
multilateral governance models. Increasingly, leaders across an ar-
ray of fields, from the former President of Estonia, Toomas Ilves,
and Director of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN), Fadi Chehade´,40 to Nobel Laureates such as
Professor Elinor Ostrom, have proffered polycentric governance as
the best path forward to addressing the global collective action
problems of climate change and cyber attacks. Policymakers seem
to be listening, as may be seen in the 2015 Paris Agreement at the
21st UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of
the Parties (COP21), which included a national pledge and review
process that marked a departure point from previous multilateral
attempts at climate negotiations.41 This approach—which too has
its faults, including a lack of hierarchy that can “yield gridlock
rather than innovation”42—is also increasingly being tried in the
human rights and cybersecurity contexts, as is discussed next in the
context of the due diligence debate.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE PRIMER
Human rights law, as opposed to CSR, has traditionally been a
multilateral response to the issue of fostering social responsibility in
governments, and indirectly the businesses they regulate. That is, it
is a top-down mechanism to achieve a desired end, but it is also one
often without the power to bind stakeholders.43 Many nations, for
39. See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change, 32 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2010), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/
pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5095.
40. See Nancy Scola, ICANN Chief: “The Whole World is Watching” the U.S.’s Net Neutrality
Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2014/10/07/internet-operations-chief-snowden-disclosures-make-my-job-easier/.
41. See David Victor, Why Paris Worked: A Different Approach to Climate Diplomacy, YALE
ENV’T 360 (Dec. 15, 2015), http://e360.yale.edu/feature/why_paris_worked_a_different_ap
proach_to_climate_diplomacy/2940/.
42. Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 PERSP.
ON POL. 7, 17 (2011), http://wws.princeton.edu/system/files/research/documents/Keo
haneVictorFinal.pdf.
43. See, e.g., Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:00
PM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights. (“In-
ternational human rights law reflects [a] . . . top-down mode of implementation. . . .”).
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example, engage in censorship practices that are in contravention
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which in-
cludes Article 19’s protections of freedom of speech,
communication, and access to information.44 This apparent disre-
gard for the UDHR highlights the difficulty of relying on non-
binding international law to check the power of national govern-
ments and foster cyber peace, which further underscores the need
for active private-sector engagement with more firms joining the
thousands that have signed up to the UN Global Compact and the
hundreds that have publicly stated policy positions on human
rights.45
Facing pushback from nations weary of top-down approaches to
fostering human rights protections, Special Representative of the
UN Security-General John Ruggie crafted the Protect, Respect, and
Remedy Framework (PRR Framework or Ruggie Framework) along
with the accompanying Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (Guiding Principles) as a polycentric response to help move
the ball forward.46 First appointed as Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises in 2005, by 2008 the
PRR Framework was ready for consideration by the Human Rights
Council.47 Rather than requiring the public and private sectors to
change their behavior, the Guiding Principles offer voluntary
frameworks and best practices that businesses can adapt to suit
their own purposes. The thinking is that, if sufficient public pres-
sure is brought, a standard of care may be indirectly created
through this name-and-shame process, shaping corporate behavior
in a perhaps more organic and politically palatable manner than
traditional human rights treaties. So far, this approach has met with
44. Internet censorship listed: how does each country compare? GUARDIAN, https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/datablog/2012/apr/16/internet-censorship-country-list
(last visited Apr. 16, 2017); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”).
45. See INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., supra note 1, at 1.
46. See, e.g., JOHN G. RUGGIE, supra note 5, at 78 (“The overriding lesson I drew . . . was
that a new regulatory dynamic was required under which public and private governance sys-
tems . . . each come to add distinct value, compensate for one another’s weaknesses, and play
mutually reinforcing roles—out of which a more comprehensive and effective global regime
might evolve, including specific legal measures. International relations scholars call this
‘polycentric governance.’”).
47. See Understanding the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, HUM. RTS. & BUS.
DILEMMAS F., http://hrbdf.org/understanding_business_responsibility/ (last visited Apr. 17,
2017).
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some success, as shown by the regime’s unanimous acceptance by
the UN Human Rights Council in 2008 and again in 2011.48
The PRR Framework is built upon three pillars: (1) the State’s
duty to prevent and address corporate human rights abuse under
international human rights law;49 (2) the corporate responsibility to
respect human rights, which exists independently from the first pil-
lar;50 and (3) access to judicial and non-judicial remedies in the
event of a breach of one or both of the first two pillars.51 Simply
put, the “appropriate corporate response to managing the risks of
infringing on the rights of others is to exercise human rights due
diligence.”52 Indeed, the Guiding Principles have done a great deal
to formalize the concept of human rights due diligence, which may
be defined as: “An ongoing [and dynamic] risk management pro-
cess . . . in order to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how
[a company] addresses its adverse human rights impacts. It includes
four key steps: assessing actual and potential human rights impacts;
integrating and acting on the findings; tracking responses; and
communicating about how impacts are addressed.”53 These steps
can, in turn, be simplified into three concrete and practical recom-
mendations, which may be unpacked as: (1) implement a human
rights policy, (2) relate it to human rights due diligence efforts, and
(3) specify a remediation mechanism.54 First, a firm’s human rights
policy should “be informed by appropriate internal and external
expertise and identify what the company expects of its personnel
and business partners. The policy should be approved at the most
senior level and communicated internally and externally to all per-
sonnel, business partners and relevant stakeholders.”55 Second,
regarding the operationalization of human rights due diligence,





51. U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Imple-
menting the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31, at
22 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.
pdf.
52. Understanding the Corporate Responsibility, supra note 47.
53. Human Rights Due Diligence, supra note 4.
54. Id.
55. Understanding the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, supra note 47. More-
over, beyond drafting and updating the policy itself, it is important for firms that: “all
internationally-recogni[z]ed human rights are understood as being relevant; that clear re-
sponsibilities are established specifying who within the company is accountable for overall
human rights policy; that the most relevant functional areas and existing policies are identi-
fied; that the company’s human rights reporting commitments are well-defined; and that
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firms should, at a minimum, commit to periodic assessments as to
the “actual and potential human rights impacts of company activi-
ties and relationships,” then integrate these commitments into
“internal control and oversight systems,” track corporate perform-
ance on a regular basis, and provide public and regular reporting
on performance.56 Finally, if adverse impacts occur, firms should
“cooperate in their remediation through legitimate processes,”57
such as through engaging third party consultancies, civil society
groups, and, if necessary, outside counsel.
Despite the clarity brought by these steps, there remains no stan-
dard way of conducting human rights due diligence; “businesses are
very diverse and they must decide what is best suited for them.”58
Regardless of the type and rate of corporate implementation,  the
most proactive firms recognize that due diligence is “not a one-time
thing[,] but an ongoing process.”59 As European policymakers have
stated,
Human rights due diligence should start at the earliest pre-
contract stages of a project’s lifecycle and continue through
operations, to the project’s decommissioning and post-closure
stages. It is about on-going processes, not one-off events such
as an impact assessment at the start of a new project, or an
annual report.60
Guides have also been created by civil society to aid firms in creat-
ing their own human rights policies, which include suggestions that
all policies, at a minimum, require: (1) “An explicit commitment to
respect all human rights which refers to international human rights
conflicts between local practice or law and international human rights standards are under-
stood and are being proactively managed.” INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., supra note 1, at
2.
56. INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., supra note 1, at 7. It is also vital that firms take a
more proactive stance, such as by “reinforcing human rights in business culture[s][,] . . .
[which could] include raising rights awareness through training and emphasizing the impor-
tance of human rights due diligence within recruitment, hiring, training and appraisal
processes, besides developing clear incentives and disincentives to encourage good perform-
ance and discourage bad behavior with regard to human rights.” Id. at 2.
57. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 51, at 24.
58. ECONSENSE, RESPECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: TOOLS AND GUIDANCE MATERIALS FOR BUSI-
NESS 8 (2014), http://www.econsense.de/sites/all/files/Respecting_Human_Rights.pdf; see
also INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., supra note 1, at 2 (arguing that “more transparency is
needed on ‘impact’ or ‘outcome’ indicators to supplement many of the more ‘process-ori-
ented’ approaches to human rights reporting currently under development.”).
59. ECONSENSE, supra note 58, at 8.
60. EUROPEAN COMM’N, OIL AND GAS SECTOR GUIDE ON IMPLEMENTING THE UN GUIDING
PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS 14 (2013).
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standards, including the UDHR; (2) discussion of labor and em-
ployee rights; (3) provisions for non-labor rights reflecting a
particular industry or sector’s environment; and (4) a commitment
for companies to act in accordance with their policy goals.”61
Beyond corporations, and reflecting the State’s duty to promote
human rights under the Guiding Principles along with firms, the
concept of human rights due diligence has also been increasingly
codified by nations, including the United States, such as under the
conflict minerals provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, which require that companies must
provide “a description of the measures taken . . . to exercise due
diligence on the source and chain of custody of minerals.”62 This
due diligence process must comport with a nationally or interna-
tionally recognized relevant framework,63 and should reflect a
“know-and-show” style of due diligence, along with auditing and re-
porting in accordance with the Guiding Principles and Professor
Ruggie’s broader vision of human rights due diligence norm.64 In
particular, Section 1502 of Dodd-Frank is likely evidence that
human rights due diligence has entered the “norm cascade” phase
of the norm life cycle in international relations in which rules of
the road become widely disseminated,65 despite some continued
controversy.66 However, the election of Donald Trump and his
promise to “dismantle Dodd-Frank” could cast doubt on this con-
clusion in the U.S. context post-2016.67 Regardless, this regime has
had an important influence on a global norm creation that would
survive  the statute’s revision or repeal.
61. ECONSENSE, supra note 58, at 10.
62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i) (2012)).
63. Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg at 56,326; see Prenkert & Shackelford, supra note 3, at
475–79.
64. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 51.
65. See JOHN G. RUGGIE, supra note 5, at 128–29 (citing Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
Sikink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998)) (describ-
ing the life-cycle of norm uptake). In contrast, the relative paucity of national or
internationally recognized due diligence frameworks that can be used by companies to com-
ply with the SEC rule and the resistance that business groups have exhibited to the due
diligence requirement are both evidence that the human rights due diligence norm has not
advanced to the internalization stage, where the norm takes on a taken-for-granted quality.
See id. (describing norm internalization). For a thorough analysis of Section 1502, see Galit A.
Sarfaty, Human Rights Meets Securities Regulation, 54 VIRG. J. INT’L L. 97 (2013).
66. See Sarfaty, supra note 65, at 98 n.6 (noting the lawsuits filed by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Business Roundtable, and industry groups to nullify SEC rules designed to opera-
tionalize Section 1502).
67. Jesse Hamilton & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Trump’s Transition Team Pledges to Dismantle
Dodd-Frank Act, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 10, 2016, 3:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2016-11-10/trump-s-transition-team-pledges-to-dismantle-dodd-frank-act.
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Beyond nations, other governance levels from local to global are
taking action on human rights due diligence—including cities,
such as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; St. Petersburg, Florida; and Edina,
Minnesota, which have passed resolutions calling on local firms to
promote human rights due diligence.68 A number of organizations
have also imparted to their stakeholders education and guidance
meant to provide additional support for and uptake of the human
rights due diligence norm. An example of such private stakeholder
human rights governance initiatives is the IPC–Association Con-
necting Electronics Industries, which has promulgated Conflict
Minerals Due Diligence Guidance.69 Similarly, in keeping with the
multi-level approach to due diligence envisioned under the
polycentric Ruggie Guiding Principles, the OECD adopted the Due
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (Due Diligence Gui-
dance) in May 2011.70 This stands in marked contrast to the
political resistance to more top-down human rights formulations,
including in the context of supply chains.71 Together, these exam-
ples highlight the fact that human rights due diligence is an
increasingly prominent—if still somewhat underdeveloped72—
shaper of corporate behavior across numerous stakeholders. Until
recently, however, the link between human rights and related areas
including cybersecurity was underappreciated. We turn to that task
68. Joe DiLeo & Tim Kolber, As Good as Gold? SEC Issues Final Rule on Conflict Minerals, 19
DELOITTE HEADS UP, Sept. 11, 2012, at app. D, https://www.iasplus.com/en/publications/
us/heads-up/2012/heads-up-2014-sec-issues-final-rule-on-conflict-minerals/file.
69. Press Release, Assoc. Connecting Electronics Indus., New IPC Guide Spells out Elec-
tronics Manufacturers’ Conflict Minerals Due Diligence Obligations, (Feb 12, 2013), http://
www.ipc.org/ContentPage.aspx?pageid=new-IPC-Guide-Spells-Out-Electronics-Manufacturers
-Conflict-Minerals-Due-Diligence-Obligations; see Mark B. Taylor, The Ruggie Framework:
Polycentric Regulation and the Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 NORDIC J. APPLIED
ETHICS 9, 23–25 (2011) (discussing how the Ruggie idea of due diligence and reporting
“knowing and showing” has been incorporated in the approach to conflict minerals).
70. OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM
CONFLICT-AFFECTED AND HIGH-RISK AREAS 3 (2d ed. 2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/
mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf.
71. Cf. Sabrina Basran, The Impact of Ruggie’s Guiding Principles for Human Rights?, CSR
INT’L (Mar. 26, 2012), http://csrinternational.blogspot.com/2012/03/impact-of-ruggies-
guiding-principles.html (“A year on, what impact has Ruggie’s Framework (particularly the
second pillar) had on business behaviour? Not much. Beyond a stated commitment to the
Guiding Principles in a few CSR reports and Code of Ethics, there has been a conspicuous
lack of activity by companies in implementing the Framework. This is not to say there has
been none, but examples are few and far between.”).
72. See Sarfaty, supra note 65, at 106 (“Critics have argued, however, that this approach
limits human rights disclosure to material impacts—that is, those impacts that may cause
legal, reputational, or other business risks—and that reporting may not lead to changes in
corporate behavior.”).
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next before discussing how these concepts may be married together
under the umbrella of sustainable development in Part IV.
III. UNPACKING CYBERSECURITY DUE DILIGENCE
What is cybersecurity due diligence, and how is it similar to, or
distinct from, conceptions of human rights due diligence? In the
private-sector transactional context, cybersecurity due diligence has
been defined as: “the review of the governance, processes and con-
trols that are used to secure information assets.”73 This increasingly
central concept to a variety of business activities as it is used here
builds from this definition and may be understood as the corpo-
rate, national, and international obligations of both State and non-
State actors to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices
and effective governance mechanisms so as to promote cyber peace
by enhancing the security ICT infrastructure and the entrenchment
of human rights. Put more simply, due diligence refers to activities
used to identify and understand the various risks facing your organ-
ization. Cybersecurity due diligence, then, is centered on risk
management best practices and obligations that may exist between
States, between non-State actors (e.g., private corporations, end-
users), and between State and non-State actors,74 and refers to the
international obligations of both State and non-State actors to help
identify and instill cybersecurity best practices so as to promote the
security of critical ICT infrastructure. In so doing, the norm “com-
mits states to ensuring that no actions originating on their territory
in times of peace violate the rights of other states.”75 But determin-
ing exactly what nations’ due diligence obligations are to secure
their networks and to prosecute or extradite cyber attackers is no
simple matter. Yet surprisingly, given the  concept’s increasing cen-
trality, it has received relatively little attention in the literature.76
73. Cyber Due Diligence: Pre-Transaction Assessments Can Uncover Costly Risks, KROLL CALL
(Jan. 28, 2015), http://blog.kroll.com/2015/cyber-due-diligence-pre-transaction-assessments
-can-uncover-costly-risks/.
74. An earlier version of this research was previously published as Shackelford, Russell,
& Kuehn, supra note 6, at 4.
75. Annegret Bendiek, Due Diligence in Cyberspace: Guidelines for International and
European Cyber Policy and Cybersecurity Policy 7 (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Re-
search Paper, 2016), http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_
papers/2016RP07_bdk.pdf.
76. Cf. White House and Department of Defense Announce Strategies to Promote Cybersecurity, 105
AM. J. INT’L L. 794, 795 (2011) (“Cybersecurity Due Diligence: States should recognize and
act on their responsibility to protect information infrastructures and secure national systems
from damage or misuse.”); John M. Prescott, Responses to Five Questions on National Security
Law, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1536, 1541 (2012) (discussing the U.S. International Strategy
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This subsection briefly reviews the relevant international law and
discusses how a small subset of companies and countries—namely
the United States and Germany—are operationalizing the concept,
before moving on to discuss areas of convergence with the litera-
ture on human rights due diligence.
The international law on cybersecurity due diligence remains
somewhat ambiguous, though there have been helpful steps for-
ward as may be seen in the Tallinn projects and related
undertakings.77 Precedent from the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), for example, must be analogized from different contexts, and
is to a certain extent contradictory. For instance, the Court held in
Corfu Channel that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow know-
ingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States.”78  As applied to cybersecurity, this decision could implicate
a duty to warn other States as to vulnerabilities in its networks that
could be exploited by malicious actors and used to harm other na-
tions.79 There is some support for this understanding as part of the
2015 G20 communique that called for a “duty to assist” victim na-
tions,80 which could implicitly include a duty to warn these nations
of impending cyber attacks. Similarly, the ICJ held in Trail Smelter
(involving a 1935 transboundary air pollution dispute between the
for Cyberspace); Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyber Attacks through
Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1354 (2013) (discussing the due diligence
aspect of the 2011 U.S. International Strategy for Cyberspace).
77. See, e.g., Tallinn Manual 2.0 to be Completed in 2016, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER DEF.
CEN. EXCELLENCE (Oct. 9, 2015), https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual-20-be-completed-2016.
html; see also Shackelford, Russell, & Kuehn, supra note 6; Shackelford & Russell, supra note
6.
78. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9), http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/1/1645.pdf.
79. See Eneken Tikk, Ten Rules for Cyber Security, 53 SURVIVAL 119, 119 (2011).
80. See Communique´, G20, G20 Leaders’ Communique´ agreed in Antalya: Antalya (Nov.
15–16, 2015), http://g20.org.tr/g20-leaders-commenced-the-antalya-summit. (“In the ICT
environment, just as elsewhere, states have a special responsibility to promote security, stabil-
ity, and economic ties with other nations. In support of that objective, we affirm that no
country should conduct or support ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, including
trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing compet-
itive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. All states in ensuring the secure use of
ICTs, should respect and protect the principles of freedom from unlawful and arbitrary inter-
ference of privacy, including in the context of digital communications. We also note the key
role played by the United Nations in developing norms and in this context we welcome the
2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, affirm that international law,
and in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to state conduct in the use of ICTs and com-
mit ourselves to the view that all states should abide by norms of responsible state behavior in
the use of ICTs in accordance with UN resolution A/C.1/70/L.45. We are committed to help
ensure an environment in which all actors are able to enjoy the benefits of secure use of
ICTs.”).
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U.S. and Canada and representing the first application of the “pol-
luter pays” principle in international law) that “no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory . . . to cause injury by
fumes . . . to the territory of another . . . when the case is of serious
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing
evidence.”81 Even though the decision was directed towards the
emission of “fumes,” Trail Smelter has come to represent the broader
“no harm” principle, which requires of States “that activities within
their jurisdiction or control respect the environment of other
States.”82 This “no harm” principle, although directed towards the
environment, enjoys parallels with cybersecurity, and may serve as
the foundation for a broader State obligation not to permit domes-
tic activities that result in serious international consequences.
However, the Court’s Nicaragua decision, in which it held that na-
tions have an obligation not to interfere in one another’s domestic
affairs if that intervention relates to “the choice of a political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign
policy,”83 may be read as being in contradiction to the Court’s ef-
fects jurisdiction analysis in Trail Smelter. This latter case also tracks
the divergent State practice on Internet governance with some
States asserting varying degrees of Internet sovereignty while others
profess internet freedom and the virtues of the “global networked
commons.”84 In summary, the ICJ jurisprudence is unsettled and is
far from dispositive on the question of a cybersecurity due diligence
norm.
As such, both State practice as well as lessons from the private
sector can and should be considered to help build out a compre-
hensive approach to due diligence. Space constraints prohibit a
thorough exploration of these topics,85 but in brief, more nations
are discussing the importance of cybersecurity due diligence, in-
cluding as part of their national cybersecurity strategies. The U.S.
government, for example, has created the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework, introduced above.86 This is important for a variety of
81. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941).
82. Ralph Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 447,
457 (Erkki Hollo et al. eds., 2012).
83. Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 106–08, 183 (June 27).
84. Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Jan. 21,
2010) in Clinton’s Speech on Internet Freedom, January 2010, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 21,
2010) http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/clintons-speech-internet-freedom-january-2010/
p21253.
85. For more, see Shackelford, Russell, & Kuehn, supra note 6; Shackelford & Russell,
supra note 6.
86. See supra note 11.
SUMMER 2017] Human Rights and Cybersecurity 877
reasons, including its roll in clarifying a standard of cybersecurity
care in the U.S. that directly plays into the topic of due diligence.87
For example, although the NIST Framework was only published in
2014, some private-sector clients are already receiving the advice
that if their “cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during
litigation or a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for ‘due dili-
gence’ was now the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.”88 Eventually,
the NIST Framework holds the potential not only to shape a stan-
dard of care for domestic critical infrastructure organizations, but
also could help to harmonize global cybersecurity best practices for
the private sector writ large given active NIST collaborations with
several dozen nations including the United Kingdom, Japan, Korea,
Estonia, Israel, and Germany.89
Germany’s cybersecurity due diligence efforts are world-leading
in many respects and rely in particular on close collaboration be-
tween the public and private sectors, nationally and globally.90 Long
known for its robust national data protection laws, Germany is now
moving to create strict cybersecurity standards for critical infrastruc-
ture as part of a broader approach to developing the field of
cybersecurity due diligence.91 For example, SWP, a leading German
defense think tank, issued a report on cybersecurity due diligence
in 2016 in which it encouraged the development of a cybersecurity
87. For more information on the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, see Scott J. Shackel-
ford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014
Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50
TEX. INT’L L.J. 303 (2015).
88. John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary, INFO. SEC. BLOG
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/risky-business/nist-cybersecurity-frame
work.
89. There is some evidence that this may already be happening, including with regards
to the Federal Trade Commission’s cybersecurity enforcement powers. See, e.g., Brian Fung, A
Court Just Made it Easier for the Government to Sue Companies for Getting Hacked, WASH. POST (Aug.
24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/08/24/a-court-just-
made-it-easier-for-the-government-to-sue-companies-for-getting-hacked/?wpmm=1&wpisrc=
NL_headlines. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell, & Jeffrey Haut,
Bottoms Up: A Comparison of “Voluntary” Cybersecurity Frameworks, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 217
(2016).
90. See BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN [FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR], CYBER-
SICHERHEITSSTRATEGIE FU¨R DEUTSCHLAND [CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY FOR GERMANY] (2016),
https://www.bmi.bund.de/cybersicherheitsstrategie/BMI_CyberSicherheitsStrategie.pdf.
91. See BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN [FED. MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR], SCHUTZ
KRITISCHER INFRASTRUKTUREN—RISIKO—UND KRISENMANAGEMENT: LEITFADEN FU¨R UN-
TERNEHMEN UND BEHO¨RDEN [PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES—RISK AND CRISIS
MANAGMENT: GUIDELINES FOR COMPANIES AND AUTHORITIES] (2011), http://www.bbk.bund.de
/SharedDocs/Downloads/BBK/DE/Publikationen/PublikationenKritis/Leitfaden_Schutz-
Kritis.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
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due diligence norm as part of Germany’s 2016 national cyber-
security strategy.92 In describing its conception of due diligence,
SWP argues that the norm builds from “the international legal stan-
dard of due diligence, which stipulates that a state must do
everything necessary to prevent actions emanating from within its
own territory that might infringe the rights of third parties[,]”93
which in turn echoes the ICJ’s holding in Trail Smelter as well as the
OECD’s work on due diligence.94 This emerging norm is playing
out in Germany and across Europe in numerous ways, including
deeper public-private cooperation (as seen in the new Network and
Information Security (NIS) Directive requiring all EU Member
States to promulgate “minimum standards and reporting require-
ments for IT security, and operators of critical infrastructure must
be involved in fighting cyber- crime,”)95 and the inclusion of more
stakeholders in the policy formation process.96 More broadly, there
is also an interrelationship between due diligence and Internet gov-
ernance to consider, in particular the continuation of a multi-
stakeholder (e.g., including both public- and private-sector organi-
zations), as opposed to a multilateral (state-on-state), approach to
regulating cyberspace.97 Debate persists about the extent to which a
cybersecurity due diligence norm—as with human rights—should
be enforceable on public- and private-sector stakeholders, and if so,
at what level of governance is it most appropriate to exercise
oversight.98
An analysis of how these cyber powers approach cybersecurity
due diligence only moves the discussion so far though, given that
many of the most innovative best practices come not from nations,
but the private sector,99 which has had to respond to a rash of cyber-
security threats. Jason Weinstein, former Deputy Assistant Attorney
92. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 5.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Scott J. Shackelford, The Coming Age of Internet Sovereignty?, in INTERNET
CENSORSHIP (Margaret Haerens & Lynn M. Zott eds., 2014) (discussing the risk of Internet
fragmentation); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Back to the Future of Internet Governance?, GEO. J.
INT’L AFF. (June 25, 2015) (analyzing the trajectory of Internet governance through the lens
of the leading cyber powers).
98. See Bendiek, supra note 75, at 6 (arguing for “arbitration authorities” being given
oversight “to ensure that due diligence is properly implemented.”).
99. See id. at 15 (discussing the extent to which the German IT sector is helping to
developing cybersecurity due diligence standards). For a list of the cyber powers, see BOOZ
ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER POWER INDEX: FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGY https://www.sbs.ox
.ac.uk/cybersecurity-capacity/system/files/EIU%20-%20Cyber%20Power%20Index%20Find
ings%20and%20Methodology.pdf.
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General at the U.S. Department of Justice, summarized the issue of
cybersecurity due diligence succinctly when he said: “When you buy
a company, you’re buying their data, and you could be buying their
data-security problems.”100 In other words, “[c]yber risk should be
considered right along with financial and legal due diligence con-
siderations.”101 A majority of respondents to one 2014 survey
reported that cybersecurity challenges are already altering the M&A
landscape,102 leading the American Bar Association to release a
cybersecurity checklist for contracting parties that features due dili-
gence.103 In other words, despite growing recognition as to the scale
and scope of the multifaceted cyber threat facing firms, many re-
main predominantly reactive,104 and are thinking of due diligence
too narrowly, artificially putting up barriers between human rights
and cybersecurity that arguably do not belong and are not helpful.
IV. LINKING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CYBERSECURITY UNDER SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
As has been discussed in Parts III and IV, due diligence is an
important concept permitting both countries and companies to
better understand and meet their risk management goals. This pro-
cess is playing out through operationalizing the no-harm principle,
by which more firms are using the Guiding Principles to instill
human rights best practices in their decision making, along with
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, to help guide cybersecurity in-
vestments.105 Similarly, countries are operationalizing these
concepts through domestic statutes ranging from Section 1502 of
100. Rachel Ensign, Cybersecurity Due Diligence Key in M&A Deals, WALL ST. J.: RISK AND
COMPLIANCE BLOG (Apr. 24, 2014, 1:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/
2014/04/24/cybersecurity-due-diligence-key-in-ma-deals.
101. Erin Ayers, Cybersecurity Easing its way into M&A Due Diligence, CYBER RISK NETWORK
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.cyberrisknetwork.com/2014/08/22/cybersecurity-easing-way-
ma-process/. [this link could not be found on my laptop]
102. Id.
103. See A.B.A. Cybersecurity Legal Task Force, VENDOR CONTRACTING PARTY: CYBER-
SECURITY CHECKLIST (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/law_
national_security/Cybersecurity%20Task%20Force%20Vendor%20Contracting%20Check
list%20v%201%2010-17-2016%20cmb%20edits%20clean.pdf.
104. See MCAFEE, UNSECURED ECONOMIES: PROTECTING VITAL INFORMATION 6 (2009),
https://www.cerias.purdue.edu/assets/pdf/mfe_unsec_econ_pr_rpt_fnl_online_012109.pdf
(comparing cybersecurity investment rates across countries and concluding that “[i]t appears
that decision makers in many countries, particularly developed ones, are reactive rather than
proactive.”).
105. See Ilse Griek, UN Forum on Human Rights: Assessing the Ruggie Framework, SUS-
TAINALYTICS, http://www.sustainalytics.com/assessing-ruggie-framework (last visited Sept. 12,
2016).
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Dodd Frank, the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, to the EU NIS Direc-
tive. However, these dual arenas of due diligence—comprising
human rights and cybersecurity—remain largely separate as matters
of corporate decision making and public policymaking, despite a
growing recognition by intergovernmental organizations and civil
society that both of these concepts are vital components of sustaina-
ble development.106 This may be seen explicitly in the 2015
Sustainable Development Goals, which state that “universal and af-
fordable access to ICTs” is vital in twenty-first century sustainable
development, but that this will not be possible without building
confidence and security across ICTs.107 This final Part explores
these linkages and how they mesh with the growing literature on
polycentric governance, ultimately arguing for a bottom-up, com-
prehensive approach to enterprise risk management.
Human rights due diligence, as embodied in the Ruggie Guiding
Principles discussed in Part II, calls for developing corporate poli-
cies, assessing the impacts of corporate actions, integration, as well
as tracking and monitoring performance such that actions mesh
well with stated goals as part of an overarching goal of mitigating
harm to other stakeholders. State action is considered—indeed, re-
quired under international human rights law—to ensure that
corporations take the necessary steps, as we have begun to see in
the United States, along with the availability of judicial and non-
judicial remedies in the event of a breach.108 Similarly, cybersecurity
due diligence is emerging under international law as a mechanism
“to hold states to account for omissions in making their infrastruc-
ture safe; for breaching their obligations by neglecting to take
action; or for a lack of cooperation in protecting against and solv-
ing cyber attacks.”109 Such sentiments have been backed up by
action at multiple governance levels above and beyond the national
and regional examples discussed above. For example, in 2000, the
UN General Assembly called upon states, “[to] ensure that their
laws and practice eliminate safe havens for those who criminally
misuse information technologies.”110 The UN Group of Govern-
mental Experts (GGE) picked up this idea in its final report of June
106. See INT’L TELECOMM. UNION, supra note 7.
107. Id.
108. See UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 48.
109. Christian Schaller, Internationale Sicherheit und Vou¨lkerrecht im Cyberspace [In-
ternational Security and International Law in Cyberspace] 25 Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik Research Paper, 2014).
110. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 8 (quoting United Nations Resolution on Combating the
Criminal Misuse of Information Technologies, G.A. Res. 55/63, at 2 (Dec. 4, 2000), http://
www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/UN_resolution_55_63.pdf).
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2015, which encourages all states to “ensure that their territories,
and especially the computer systems and infrastructure situated
there or otherwise under the states’ control, is not misused for at-
tacks on the infrastructure of other states.”111 In other words, States
are increasingly expected by the international community to work
“in cooperation with other states . . . to do everything that may be
reasonably expected of them to help deliver an ‘open, free and se-
cure Internet.’”112 This requires domestic policies with, according
to SWP, a high level of representativity, inclusiveness, and trans-
parency,113 mirroring calls for a more robust human rights due
diligence regime. Indeed, the argument has been made that, to be
truly effective, firms exercising human rights due diligence should
perhaps go beyond the Ruggie Framework and include require-
ments of transparency, external participation and verification, as
well as continuous monitoring and review in order to meet their
human rights goals.114 These common notions of diverse represen-
tation, inclusiveness, transparency, verification, and effective
dispute resolution, in turn, mirror both the overriding goals of sus-
tainable development—in particular the “no harm” principle
introduced in Part I(B), which also is integral to discussions of
human rights and cybersecurity due diligence—and polycentric
governance.
Beginning in the early 1990s with her groundbreaking book Gov-
erning the Commons, Professor Elinor Ostrom created an informative
framework of eight design principles for the management of com-
mon pool resources known as the Ostrom design principles, which
has come to represent some of the core features of successful
polycentric systems.115 These principles include the importance of:
(1) “clearly defined boundaries for the user pool . . . and the re-
source domain”;116 (2) “proportional equivalence between benefits
and costs”;117 (3) “collective choice arrangements” ensuring “that
the resource users participate in setting . . . rules”;118 (4) “monitor-
ing . . . by the appropriators or by their agents”;119 (5) “graduated
111. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 8.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See James Harrison, An Evaluation of the Institutionalisation of Corporate Human
Rights Due Diligence (2012) Warwick School of Law Research Paper 2012/18, http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2117924.
115. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 212 (1990).
116. SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 32 (1998).
117. See OSTROM, supra note 115, at 90.
118. BUCK, supra note 116, at 32.
119. Id.
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sanctions” for rule violators”;120 (6) “conflict-resolution mechanisms
[that] are readily available, low cost, and legitimate”;121 (7) “mini-
mal recognition of rights to organize”;122 and (8) “governance
activities [being] . . . organized in multiple layers of nested enter-
prises.”123 Not all of Professor Ostrom’s design principles are
applicable in either the context of human rights or cybersecurity,
and space constraints prohibit a deep analysis here.124 However, the
overlap between many of these principles—including diverse repre-
sentation, monitoring, and effective dispute resolution
mechanisms—with efforts to refine and build out the sustainable
development due diligence norm is apparent.
The fields of cybersecurity and human rights due diligence are
further coming together explicitly surrounding issues of civil rights
and data protection.125 This convergence may be seen in such areas
as the Internet freedom and net neutrality movement regarding the
free flow of information and ideas across borders, which is part and
parcel of the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance
discussed in Part III.126 A key question for Internet governance go-
ing forward is how best to assure “the availability, confidentiality,
authenticity[,] and integrity of data[,]”127 as well as, more broadly,
how best to reinforce human rights best practices across stakehold-
ers—including, but not limited to, private users, civil society,
academia, and the public and private sectors—as part of the over-
arching debate on Internet governance and informational self-
determination.128 It is vital to foster the active engagement of di-
verse stakeholders, including representative civil society interests, in
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diversity of Organi-
zations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES
INVOLVING A DIVERSITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 105, 118 tbl. 5.3 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds., 2012)
(noting that polycentric systems frequently enjoyed better outcomes than those of central
governments).
123. Id.
124. See Prenkert & Shackelford, supra note 3; in MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS, supra note 9,
at Ch. 2.
125. See Bendiek, supra note 75, at 19.
126. See id. at 22; see also Madeline Carr, Power Plays in Global Internet Governance, 43 MIL-
LENNIUM J. OF INT’L STUD. 640 (2014) (arguing for a more balanced approached to studying
the benefits and drawbacks of multi-stakeholder Internet governance, including its capacity
to reinforce existing (potentially skewed) power dynamics).
127. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 22. One manifestation of this trend is the debate over
“fake news” and its mitigation. See, e.g., Peter Kafka, Facebook Has Started to Flag Fake News
Stories, RECODE (Mar. 4, 2017, 6:22 PM), http://www.recode.net/2017/3/4/14816254/face
book-fake-news-disputed-trump-snopes-politifact-seattle-tribune .
128. See Bendiek, supra note 75, at 22; see also Scott J. Shackelford, Should Cybersecurity Be a
Human Right?, CONVERSATION (Feb. 13, 2017, 9:15 PM), http://theconversation.com/should-
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order for effective progress to be made in this context, and for the
promise of multi-stakeholder Internet governance more generally
to be realized in keeping with the core principles of both sustaina-
ble development and polycentric governance.129
The convergence of human rights, cybersecurity, and Internet
governance more generally has also begun to be codified, such as
may be seen by the UN Human Rights Council’s 2012 resolution
that human rights are equally valid online and offline.130 Since this
resolution, the debate has moved on to topics like encryption, with
the “UN’s special rapporteur on freedom of expression, David
Kaye, call[ing] for the encryption of private communications to be
made a standard.”131 International data flows, including those from
the European Union to the United States, and vice versa, also con-
tinue to be a hot topic with the fall of the Safe Harbor regime and
the rise of the Privacy Shield.132 Another overarching concern is the
appropriate role for, and degree of, cybersecurity regulation being
imposed by countries. SWP argues, for example, that “States should
only intervene in a regulatory capacity when self-regulation can no
longer guarantee democratic legitimacy, effectiveness, rule of law
and transparency.”133 This perspective, in turn, resonates with the
findings of the polycentric governance literature, which warns
against “crowding out” smaller-scale efforts,134 such as the experi-
mentation surrounding due diligence being undertaken by firms,
cities, countries, and regions discussed throughout this Article.
CONCLUSION
From 2010–15, the Institute for Human Rights and Business ar-
gued that the overriding goals with regards to human rights due
diligence should be broadly interpreted to achieve growth and
cybersecurity-be-a-human-right-72342 (discussing the extent to which Internet access and
cybersecurity are emerging human rights).
129. See, e.g., Carr, supra note 126, at 657; Stuart N. Brotman, Multistakeholder Internet Gov-
ernance: A Pathway Completed, the Road Ahead. CTR. FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS (July
2015) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/multistakeholder.pdf.
130. Id.; Human Rights Council Res. 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/L.13 (June 29, 2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A.H
RC.20.L.13_en.doc.
131. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 19.
132. For more on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Seeking a Safe Harbor in a Widen-
ing Sea: Unpacking the EJC’s Schrems Decision and What it Means for Transatlantic
Relations (Oct. 26, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
133. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 23.
134. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex
Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 656 (2010).
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deepen understanding.135 More specifically, the Institute identified
five themes in need of greater attention: “(1) Developing human-
centered approach to business management; (2) establishing clarity
about the explicit use of human rights terminology, standards and
language; (3) integrating human rights in contractual relation-
ships; (4) setting up accountability and grievance-mechanisms; and
(5) ensuring transparency.”136 In many ways, the challenge from
2016–21 remains the same, except to add to this list the need to
incorporate cybersecurity within firms’ human rights due diligence
operations as part of a broader conceptualization of how corporate
operations are impacting sustainable development and avoiding
harm to others, a concept that could be called sustainable due dili-
gence. As SWP argues, the due diligence norm is powerful given
that, among other things, “[i]t expresses the cooperative and global
character of a good international cyber and cybersecurity policy,
without concealing its domestic foundations. Modern (cyber) for-
eign and security policies are always also domestic policies.”137 The
same may be said for human rights, which is also being operational-
ized at multiple governance scales, from city ordinances to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission to the UN itself, a process
that will likely continue to gain traction as awareness of the concept
in both the public and private sectors is further raised.
However, for sustainable due diligence to reach its true and most
comprehensive potential, more robust enforcement mechanisms
must be put into place, as was stated in the UN GGE statement
committing States to “stop [cyber] attacks that emanate from their
territories and also commit to not deliberately damaging other
countries’ critical infrastructure or IT emergency teams.”138 The G2
cybersecurity code of conduct, 2016 G7 statement in support of
cybersecurity norm building, and G20 list of cyber norms similarly
provide fruitful ground on which to build out cybersecurity due dil-
igence and further entrench it with human rights best practices,
particularly as they relate to promoting the free flow of informa-
tion, protecting privacy, and boosting economic development, all of
which have been identified as being within the corpus of human
rights law.139 Furthermore, more work needs to be done on verifica-
tion, transparency, and extraterritoriality in the sustainable due
135. INST. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & BUS., supra note 1, at 3.
136. Id.
137. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 31.
138. Id.
139. See Communique´, supra note 80; G7 Leaders Approve Historic Cybersecurity Agreement,
BOSTON GLOBAL F (June 6, 2016), http://bostonglobalforum.org/2016/06/g7-leaders-pro
duce-historic-cybersecurity-agreement/; Teri Robinson, U.S., China Agree to Cybersecurity Code
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diligence context comprising cybersecurity, data privacy, and
human rights considerations, lest we set out on a “collision course
for different national legal systems, which would encourage the
fragmentation of the global economic space and the Internet.”140
Deeper information sharing is also a vital component of an inte-
grated due diligence norm, such as the pooling of cyber incident
data into a repository that the public and private sectors can use to
anonymously “share, store, aggregate, and analyze sensitive” cyber
threat data as well as best practices.141 Ultimately, countries and
companies, policymakers and directors must come together to prac-
tice sustainable due diligence through polycentric governance if
the broader goals of avoiding harm, as well as promoting human
rights and cyber peace, are to be achieved.
of Conduct, SC MAG. (June 26, 2015), http://www.scmagazine.com/us-china-summit-talks-
turn-to-cybersecurity/article/423175/; see also G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, pmbl., arts. 12, 23, Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), http://www.un.org/en/universal-de
claration-human-rights/.
140. Bendiek, supra note 75, at 32.
141. See DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., Enhancing Resilience through Cyber Incident Data Shar-
ing and Analysis: The Value Proposition for Cyber Incident Data Repository 2 (2015), https:/
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